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INTRODUCTION
This research examines why hate speech towards minority groups, or individuals is
constitutionally protected, while defamatory speech towards individuals is not protected
by the First Amendment of the Constitution. There are laws prohibiting racial and sexual
harassment in an education setting or workplace environment, as well as libel and
slander laws that punish defamation of someone’s character. Defamation, like hate
speech, can originate from a place of hate. Why isn't hate speech automatically
considered unprotected speech under the First Amendment, just like defamation?
Not all hateful speech is protected, in Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire (1942),
"fighting words" were considered unprotected by the First Amendment. The Court said
fighting words were those, "which by their very utterance inflict injury" and which "are no
essential part of any exposition of ideas." The decision defined the limits of free speech
when harmful speech could cause a breach of the peace. The Court could have
extended Chaplinsky to harmful speech across racial, ethnic and religious lines. (Bleich,
2011, p. 922). Another prominent case recognizing a First Amendment exception for
speech targeting a race was Beauharnais v. Illinois (1952) where the Supreme Court
said that group libel statutes were constitutional. The White Circle League of America's
leader was convicted for passing around literature calling for the rapes, robbery, guns,
knives, and marijuana of the Negro. Unfortunately, in the immediate aftermath of the
case little was done in Congress to advance the actions of the Court into a federal
statute (Bleich, 2011, p. 922).
In addition, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes a racially or sexually
hostile workplace illegal. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 makes a
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sexually hostile education setting illegal, and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act makes a
racially hostile education environment illegal.
In addition, in 2009 Congress passed the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr.
Hate Crimes Prevention Act making it a federal crime to assault or kill a person with a
clear racial motivation. The law also expanded federal hate crime law to apply to crimes
motivated by a victim's actual or perceived gender, sexual orientation, gender identity,
or disability.
This paper argues that hate speech is not worthy of protection, just like the
fighting words of Chaplinsky, the group libel of Beauharnais, the hostile employment
and educational environment outlawed by the nation’s civil rights laws and the hate
crimes outlawed by the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr Act. Hate speech
encompasses no “essential part of the exposition of ideas.” (Chaplinsky) Hate speech
inflicts harm on those who it is aimed at, and, as the Court says, is “of such slight social
values as a step to the truth than any benefit that may be derived…is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.” (Beauharnais). Hate speech
serves no intellectual purpose in advancing society.
Literature Review
European democracies have been stricter in passing and enforcing hate speech than
the United States. Some European countries have enacted laws to ban hate speech
completely, because it causes more harm than good for society and after witnessing
what hate speech can do during the rise of the Nazi Germany and World War II. But
American courts have taken a more absolutist approach, believing that if such speech is
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curtailed it could negatively impact our civil liberties. They protect speech even if it may
be harmful to a person’s dignity, character, or livelihood.
Europe:
There has been a tradition of freedom of expression and opinion in America.
Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, Thomas Paine, and Oliver Wendell Holmes, were
influenced by European philosophers, like John Stuart Mill and John Milton who
believed in the cultivation of the intellect unfettered by government would result in
significant contributions to society. They believed speech was a powerful tool that could
be used to motivate people to affect change whether it be against an absolutist
monarchy or a new nation founded on liberal principles of equal speech amongst the
populace. In John Milton's own writings specifically The Aeropagitica, he discusses why
the truth will win out against falsehood on the battlefield between good and evil. What
Milton is saying is that ideas need to be debated by both sides, so that freedom will
prevail (stlawrenceinstitute.org). According to John Stuart Mill's own writings in 1859,
who believed that it was ethical to express oneself even if someone else thought it was
immoral. Mill said, "I may disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death
your right to say it" (Bleich, 2011, p. 917). However, speech can have limitations and
Mill also had a 'harm principle', which had guidelines that by law would limit expression
around permissible speech.
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., first expressed the “marketplace of ideas” in
his dissent in Abrams v. United States (1919). As part of the freedom of expression
Holmes, following in the tradition of John Stuart Mill, believed the truth will emerge from
the competition of ideas in a free and open democracy.
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When it comes to racist speech and opinion Europe, particularly Western Europe
there have been constraints on speech involving racism. Incitement to racial hatred
along with Holocaust denial laws have been passed in European countries to limit AntiSemitic beliefs, but in the United States we have continued to examine the First
Amendment and the protections it affords to racist speech (Bleich, 2011, p. 918).
Of course Europeans didn't magically come to the conclusion that hate speech
should be made illegal because of the racial, ethnic, and religious divisions it caused.
There were Anti-Semitic newspapers and books in Germany during the Weimar
Republic along with the Third Republic France. Some in the British Parliament tried to
outlaw racist speech in 1936 on the purposed grounds to racial or religious prejudice,
mostly to combat against Oswald Mosely's British Union of Fascists (Bleich, 2011, p.
919). The MPs' were against the law, because they believed it would forbid criticism of
the church and that of Germany and France, which could cause prejudice towards
Germans and French 'races'. Ultimately, the U.K. Attorney General struck down the
proposed bill citing neutral, catch-all language banning incitement to disorder was in
keeping with legal precedent. The language regarding racial and religious incitement
encompassed narrow wording that was too limiting (Bleich, 2011, p. 919).
Even in the early 60s when Conservatives' were in power in the United Kingdom
they fought against reforms to pass laws against racial incitement despite the fact that
430,000 citizens signed a petition wanted such action. Well, elections have
consequences and the 1964 election brought the Labour Party into power and with it
reforms using the proposed law as a tool for integration for immigrants. Their argument
was to prevent first and second class development amongst the citizens, which could
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allow inequality from one group to another and incite feelings of hatred between various
ethnic and racial groups. The 1965 Race Relations Act, specifically Sec. 6, made it
illegal to intentionally use threatening, abusive, or insulting language likely to stir up
hatred against sections of the British public on the grounds of colour, race, or
ethnic/national origins (Bleich, 2011, p. 919). Additionally, the 1986 Public Order Act
extended protection to groups defined by nationality and eased requirements in proving
transgressions by eliminating the need for intent and likelihood to express in utterance.
In England, during the 1960s after the Labour Party became the party in power in
government, Home Secretary Frank Soskice helped pass a law against racial incitement
(Bleich, 2011). Soskice’s reasoning was to help assimilate immigrants into British
society, by allowing immigrants to feel like first-class instead of second-class citizens
and alleviate feelings “other” from Christian Englishmen toward racial, ethnic, and
religious minorities.
After debate in the House of Commons with staunch opposition by the
Conservative Party who were holding up bills and debates in a very similar style to the
Southern Democrats use of the filibuster during the Civil Rights Era in the United States;
Parliament passed the 1965 Race Relations Act. (Section 6) rendered it illegal to
intentionally use threatening, abusive or insulting language likely to stir up hatred
against sections of the British public on the grounds of colour, race, or ethnic/national
origins(Bleich, 2011). After WWII Germany had enacted laws prohibiting Nazi rhetoric
and symbols, because they could undermine democracy, as well as using phrases and
symbols, like “Heil Hitler!”, or flying Nazi flags, especially with swastikas. Laws passed
and made it illegal to incite hate, advocate violence, insult, and ridicule or defame
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minorities in the populace, because of the breach of public peace (Stein, 1986).
According to Bleich, most European democracies began passing hate speech laws
targeted at racism and religious intolerance in the 60s and 70s.
Anti-Semitism was rampant in Germany and France prior to WWII. Anti-Semitic
books and stories in newspapers did not hide their feelings of prejudice towards a
religious minority.
In Germany, Parliament unanimously passed a law citing hate speech and racist
rhetoric only served to undermine the democratic order in 1960. Expression of racism
was not tolerated and the government banned Nazi rhetoric and symbols including,
flags, swastikas, the 'Heil Hitler!' salute, and prohibited National Socialist propaganda
(Bleich, 2011, p. 920). The German government unanimously voted to reform Article
130 of their criminal code making it illegal to incite hatred, provoke violence, insult, and
ridicule, or defame in a manner apt to breach the public peace.
In Germany and Austria if anyone walks down the street goose stepping, raising
their arm to salute Hitler, or anything that could be perceived as racist that harkens back
to that dark time in Europe one could be arrested on the spot whether or not your
actions were intentional, or if you were “just joking” and were intoxicated. Austria and
other European countries have passed laws forbidding Holocaust denial, downplay the
damage it created, or make excuses to why it even happened (Bleich, 2011, p. 917).
This is a controversial step that some see as a limit on free expression. In 2006 British
historian David Irving was convicted for stating there were no gas chambers at
Auschwitz, and Hitler had tried to protect Jews not murder them, and that Kristallnacht
(Night of Broken Glass, against Jews throughout Nazi Germany and Austria on 9–10
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November 1938, carried out by SA paramilitary and non-Jewish civilians) was carried
out by agitators dressed as Nazis instead of by the Nazi party.
France only passed anti-racism laws in 1972, there had been efforts and political
pressure for years, but prominent politicians argued that legislation regarding racial
incitement was unnecessary. Fortunately, Jean Foyer, Chairman of the National
Assembly Law Committee realized racist-inspired acts occurred and there should be
specific punishments against it (Bleich, 2011, p. 920).
U.S. Cases:
The U.S. has protected people’s rights to utter hate speech with the protection of
the First Amendment. When particular speech has zero value in the education or worth
of our society does it truly deserve a place amongst civilized human beings who may be
disgusted by public displays of language and symbols that could defame, or injure a
person? What value does it have for democracy?
"Fighting words" those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite
an immediate breach of the peace was the defining moment in Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire (1942). Walter Chaplinsky, a Jehovah's Witness, was passing out pamphlets
on a public sidewalk and called organized religion a "racket." People gathered around
which caused a public disturbance, and a police officer, who already warned Chaplinsky
to keep the noise down approached Chaplinsky again, which resulted in Chaplinsky
verbally assaulting the police officer calling him a "God-damned racketeer" and "a
damned fascist" in a public place. He was arrested and convicted under a state law for
violating a breach of the peace (Chaplinsky). The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that
Chaplinsky violated the state statute, which prevents intentional offensive speech being
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directed at people in a public place. Chaplinsky believed the statute violated his First
and Fourteenth Amendment rights to free speech, but Justice Frank Murphy, writing the
opinion of the Court said, “well-defined and narrowly limited” categories of speech fall
outside the bounds of constitutional protection.
Thus, “the lewd and obscene, the profane, the slanderous,” and (in this case)
insulting or “fighting” words neither contributed to the expression of ideas nor possessed
any “social value” in the search for truth (Chaplinsky). The Court ultimately found that
free speech is not absolute under all circumstances. There can be cases when speech
is narrowly defined and the New Hampshire statute was found to be narrowly tailored to
punish specific conduct, in this case "fighting words", so the Court held that the statute
was not unconstitutional towards the right of free speech, therefore, this is content
based restriction applied in a narrow circumstance.
The landmark group-libel case Beauharnais v. Illinois (1952), punished
statements aimed at racial and religious groups that would expose 'the citizen of any
race, colour, creed or religion to contempt, derision or obloquy or which is productive of
breach of the peace or riots' (Bleich, 2011, p. 922). Joseph Beauharnais was president
of the White Circle League, Inc. and he was arrested for passing out leaflets asking the
mayor and city of Chicago "to halt the further encroachment, harassment and invasion
of white people…by the Negro.” Beauharnais was found guilty of violating an Illinois
statute making it illegal to distribute any publication that "exposes the citizens of any
race, color, creed, or religion to contempt, derision, or obloquy.” Justice Frankfurter
authored the opinion of the Court, which concluded that his speech consisted of libel
and beyond constitutional protection.
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In Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969), Brandenburg was the KKK leader who made a
speech at a KKK rally calling for the use of violence to achieve political reform.
Brandenburg was convicted of violating an Ohio criminal syndicalism law, which made
advocating the use of violence, sabotage, and terrorism tactics for achieving political
reform unlawful, and assembling "with any society, group, or assemblage of persons
formed to teach or advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism.” In a per curiam
opinion, the Court ruled that Brandenburg's free speech was violated, but also said
speech can be prohibited if it "directed at inciting or producing imminent lawless action,"
and it is "likely to incite or produce such action." The Ohio statute was found to be
overly broad, because the law was not clear if teaching and advocacy of doctrines
would actually incite imminent lawless action, thus making the statute unconstitutional.
In Collin v. Smith (1978), a case involving members of the American Nazi Party
wanted to march in a parade in Skokie, ILL, a suburban city of Chicago where there is a
considerable Jewish population with some Holocaust survivors. The group wished to
express themselves by proclaiming white supremacy and anti-Semitism, but the city
council blocked the Nazis from marching with ordinances, however; the Nazis sued in
federal court citing content-based regulations.
In the opinion of the Seventh Circuit Court, Judge Pell stated, “that the
fundamental proposition that if these civil rights are to remain vital for all, they must
protect not only those society deems acceptable, but also those whose ideas it quite
justifiably rejects and despises” (Collin). Judge Sprecher who dissented in part and
concurred in part, addressed the complex issue of members of the Jewish community
feeling they were being inundated with fighting words, group libel, and hostile audience

10

if the march occurred. Sprecher believed that there might be need for the government
to balance these situations regardless of a prior restraint on the demonstration by the
Nazis to have empathy with groups of people that have experienced historical attitudes
of hate.
In Texas v. Johnson (1989), Greg Johnson was burned the American flag outside
city hall in Dallas as a means of protest against the Reagan administration. Johnson
was convicted under a Texas statute, which outlawed flag desecration and he was
sentenced to a year in jail and fined $2,000. In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that
Johnson’s flag burning was protected as expression under the First Amendment. His
conduct was found to be political in nature, and if an audience found the expression of
his ideas offensive, the state cannot justify their statute prohibiting speech. Justice
William Brennan wrote for the majority, “If there is a bedrock principle underlying the
First Amendment, it is that the Government may not prohibit the expression of an idea
simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable” (Johnson). The
Court rejected the argument that (Brandenburg) should be applied here, because there
was no “breach of the peace,” or “imminent lawless action” in Johnson’s flag burning
and Texas already had statutes that violated “breaches of the peace” directly.
In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul (1992), the U.S. Supreme Court heard a case
involving a St. Paul ordinance punishing the placement of certain symbols that were
"likely to arouse anger, alarm, or resentment on the basis of race, religion, or gender.”
One teen had violated the ordinance by burning a cross on an African-American family’s
yard. The Court, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, reversed (R. A. V.'s) conviction on the
ground that the ordinance unconstitutionally criminalized some hurtful expression
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(specifically that aimed at racial and religious minorities) and no other hurtful expression
(that aimed at other unprotected groups) based on the political preferences of
legislators. Scalia makes clear that "fighting words" is not, as Chaplinsky had
suggested, a category of speech that is wholly outside of First Amendment protection
Scalia’s reasoning is based on how a reasonable person would feel about the burning of
a cross, and not how a more sensitive person would feel.
However, the next year in Wisconsin v. Mitchell (1993), a Wisconsin statute
imposed stiffer sentences for racially-motivated assaults than for other types of
assaults. Mitchell, a young black man started a fight with a young white man, and the
Kenosha County court ruled the increase in fines were justified because he selected his
victim because of his race. Mitchell argued that the statute violated his First
Amendment rights. The U.S. Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion, reasoned that the
statute did not violate the First Amendment because it paralleled antidiscrimination laws
that comply with the First Amendment. The statute was aimed primarily at regulating
conduct, not speech.
In Virginia v Black (2003), the Court was divided on the question of whether a
state could prohibit cross burning carried out with the intent to intimidate. They
concluded in a plurality decision that, because cross-burning has a history as a
"particularly virulent form of intimidation," Virginia could prohibit that form of expression
while not prohibiting other types of intimidating expression. The Court found the crossburning statute to fall within one of R. A. V.'s exceptions to the general rule that contentbased prohibitions on speech violate the First Amendment. The Court seems to find
issues back and forth regarding content versus conduct, versus context when dealing
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with issues of hate speech (both spoken and symbolic) on a case-to-case basis
(Virginia).
However, the Court believed that the family in (Virginia), was actually threatened
because the three individuals violated the Virginia statute making it a felony "for any
person..., with the intent of intimidating any person or group..., to burn...a cross on the
property of another, a highway or other public place," and specifies that "any such
burning...shall be prima facie evidence of an intent to intimidate a person or group,"
(Virginia).
Justice Clarence Thomas wrote in his dissent that cross burning should be a First
Amendment exception, as others have argued regarding flag burning (Johnson). The
statute, "prohibits only conduct, not expression. And, just as one cannot burn down
someone's house to make a political point and then seek refuge in the First
Amendment, those who hate cannot terrorize and intimidate to make their point"
(Virginia). Thomas is saying that cross-burning is a different act of a hate crime, and
the special nature of conduct of cross-burning is analogous to Nazi swastikas, flags,
symbols and rhetoric in Europe. Justice David Souter wrote that cross-burning, even
with intent to intimidate, should not be a crime under the precedent set in R.A.V.
In Snyder v Phelps (2011), the Supreme Court overturned a jury verdict against a
Kansas-based anti-gay church group that picketed the funeral of a marine who died on
duty in Iraq. (The group believes that soldiers' deaths are a form of punishment against
America for tolerating homosexuality). A Maryland jury had found that the picketing and
Internet postings by the group targeted the soldier's parents and constituted intentional
infliction of emotional distress. Chief Justice Roberts noted that the Westboro Baptist
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Church group's speech generally related to a matter of public concern, that the group
complied with all city ordinances and police department requests, and that the funeral
itself was not disrupted. However; Justice Alito dissented, arguing that at least some of
the group's speech directly attacked the Snyder family and therefore did not relate to a
matter of public concern. "Our profound national commitment to free and open debate is
not a license for the vicious verbal assault that occurred in this case” (Phelps).
Statutes punishing hate crimes:
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 allows federal prosecution of anyone who "willingly
injures, intimidates or interferes with another person, or attempts to do so, by force
because of the other person's race, color, religion or national origin." Persons violating
this law face a fine or imprisonment of up to one year, or both. If bodily injury results or if
such acts of intimidation involve the use of firearms, explosives or fire, individuals can
receive prison terms of up to 10 years, while crimes involving kidnapping, sexual
assault, or murder can be punishable by life in prison or the death penalty (18 U.S.C.
Section 245).
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, prohibits discrimination by covered employers on
the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin, it also applies to an individual
associating with another individual from one of the above groups (CRA, 1964). Title VI
declares that programs and activities receiving Federal financial assistance may not
discriminate on the grounds of race, color, or national origin. Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972, prohibited discrimination under any education program or activity
receiving federal financial assistance.
The Matthew Shepard and James Byrd Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act
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expanded the 1969 federal hate crime law, which criminalized actions against
individuals because of their race, color, gender, or national origin (18 U.S.C. Section
245 (B)(2)). The Shepard-Byrd statute included crimes motivated by a victim's actual or
perceived gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, or disability. Shepard was a gay
student who was tortured and murdered for his sexuality, and Byrd was an AfricanAmerican man who was dragged behind a truck, which resulted in his decapitation, both
crimes occurred in 1998. The statute removes the prerequisite that the victim be
engaging in a federally protected activity, like voting or going to school; gives federal
authorities greater ability to engage in hate crimes investigations that local authorities
choose not to pursue; provides $5 million per year in funding for fiscal years 2010
through 2012 to help state and local agencies pay for investigating and prosecuting hate
crimes; requires the FBI to track statistics on hate crimes based on gender and gender
identity (statistics for the other groups were already tracked) (Trout, 2015, p. 13).
The recent Oklahoma fraternity case, where two students were expelled for
singing a virulently racist song on a fraternity bus, involves a clash between free speech
and the obligation of universities to ensure under the federal civil rights laws that they
are acting affirmatively create an educational environment free of racial hostility.
Feldman argues that public universities are organs of the state and are akin to
government, and universities are meant to be communities of learning that require
decorum and are more restrictive than the public square. Insults, screaming, and
denouncing someone may be protected by the First Amendment, but said speech
doesn't belong in a classroom (Bloombergview.com). The fraternity can be banned for
discrimination, which is conduct, but speaking in favor of discrimination is protected
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speech. However, David Boren, President of the University of Oklahoma, said he
expelled the students for their “leadership role in leading a racist and exclusionary
chant, which has created a hostile educational environment for others.” This goes back
to Civil Rights laws, especially Title VI, which prohibits a racially hostile education
environment.
Mr. Boren has said the students were expelled because their speech was a form
of discriminatory conduct that created a hostile educational environment for AfricanAmerican students. Having pledges repeat a chant not admitting an African-American
is racial discrimination and by expelling the two chant leaders from campus fulfills the
educational goal of maintaining a non-hostile education environment
(Bloombergview.com). If in the workplace co-workers said blacks were unqualified for
the job it would be considered discriminatory speech under Title VII, however, in public
the speech would be protected as opinion, but at work it is discriminatory conduct in the
form of speech.
The law doesn’t ban speech; it bans the act of discriminating. And when laws are
aimed at conduct that incidentally burdens speech, the courts don’t subject them to the
same strict scrutiny they apply to laws directed primarily at speech
(Bloombergview.com). The school is performing their legal obligation to provide a nonhostile educational environment by prohibiting racially hostile conduct.
Many First Amendment scholars argued, however that the president of the
university violated the students’ free speech rights by expelling them. Hate speech is
protected by the First Amendment so a state university cannot expel a student for
hateful expression, especially when it is off-campus. (Volokh)
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Opposition to Hate Crime Statutes:
Some people question why have hate crime laws all when hate crime involves a
separate crime punishable by existing law? Justifications for enforcing hate crimes
separately is because the motivation of hatred, bias, or prejudice, the moral culpability
of the wrongdoer is greater than that of a person who commits a crime without that
motivation. Therefore the punishment ought to be proportionally greater (Trout, 2015,
p.131). Hate crimes target a community and not just a single individual, when someone
is attacked because of particular characteristics it sends fear inside that members of
that particular community. Moreover, existing criminal statutes have been ineffective at
deterring hate crimes perpetrators, so additional deterrence is needed (Trout, 2015,
p.131).
The opponents of hate crime statutes claim that existing laws are good enough to
combat crime; they claim that hate crime laws give more protection to certain groups of
people that everyone cannot enjoy equally; they contend that hate crime laws are
inefficacious, perhaps even counter-productive by provoking retaliation against
protected groups, and opponents often raise First Amendment constitutional challenges
to hate crime laws, arguing that valid speech against certain groups is suppressed or
chilled by hate crime legislation (Trout, 2015, p. 131).
Hate crime statutes raise a complicated set of First Amendment concerns, and
potentially rely on impermissible content-based distinctions. However, Shepard-Byrd
avoids these complications, because it does not extend to threats, and all First
Amendment challenges have so far been unsuccessful (Trout, 2015, p. 131).
A group of pastors sued in an attempt to enjoin enforcement of the Shepard-Byrd
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Act over the First Amendment. The Sixth Circuit upheld the District Court's dismissal for
the pastors' lack of standing citing that the plaintiffs haven't shown an intent to violate
the Act, or prove to have shown sufficient evidence they would be subjected to adverse
law enforcement action. Since the case was resolved on standing grounds it shows that
First Amendment concerns were overblown and that limiting the Act to bodily injury
precludes any valid First Amendment problems (Trout, 2015, p. 131).
James Dobson, founder of Focus on the Family, a socially conservative group,
opposed the Shepard-Byrd law saying it would "muzzle people of faith who dare to
express their moral and biblical concerns about homosexuality" (nytimes.com). In the
House version of the bill, H.R. 1592, there is a rule called the "Rule of Construction",
which specifically provides that "Nothing in this Act...shall be construed to prohibit any
expressive conduct protected from legal prohibition by, or any activities protected by the
free speech or free exercise clauses of the First Amendment (H.R. 1592).
Brian Walsh, senior legal fellow at The Heritage Foundation, writes that the
HCPA (Hate Crimes Prevention Act or 2009, or Shepard-Byrd Act) would federalize
violent, non-economic conduct that is truly local in nature and have little or no federal
nexus (theheritagefoundation.com). He claims Congress lacks the constitutional power
to create the HCPA, and state law enforcement would be hindered by the statute. He
makes clear that racially motivated violence is repugnant, but the Fourteenth
Amendment provides equal protection under the law and there is no evidence that
states don't enforce civil and criminal laws unevenly. Also, he mentions that 45 of the
50 states have passed "hate crimes" statutes responding to violence and intimidation
based on bias.
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Walsh continues to say that the HCPA is to broad regarding "hate crimes" and
doesn't require the government to prove that the accused was motivated by bias,
prejudice, or hatred. 44 of the 45 states already have stringent penalties on violent acts
related to race, religion, or ethnicity, and 31 states do so for violence toward individuals
regarding sexual orientation (theheritagefoundation.com). Walsh further argues that the
Constitution doesn't grant Congress or the federal government general police power,
therefore, Congress doesn't have the power to criminalize the majority of violent, noneconomic activity inside the principal criminal offenses in the Act. Congress's
Commerce Clause power is an insufficient argument. The HCPA applies to anyone
who, "willfully causes bodily injury to any person or, through the use of fire, a firearm, or
an explosive or incendiary device, attempts to cause bodily injury to any person.” This
violent, non-economic activity does not involve interstate commerce
(theheritagefoundation.com).
All crime is punishable by the government of every state, regardless of the
motivation of the accuser or the victim's identity. Almost all states have adopted some
kind of "hate crime" statute, which under the Constitution doesn't exceed their (the
states’) authority to criminalize violent, non-economic activity that remains local in
nature.
Yong vs. Taylor:
Caleb Yong and Robert S. Taylor, have different views and approaches about
how hate speech should be regulated, if at all. Yong favors specific categories of hate
speech that can and should be regulated by government, while other types of hate
speech are protected. Taylor is more concerned about civil libertarian protections on
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speech is best for democracy except for very narrow circumstances. Taylor believes
that the priority of liberty is paramount and hate speech as Yong has defined it is
against the priority of liberty and civil libertarian values. Only very narrowly defined
terms of hate speech such as “face-to-face vilification” by means of “fighting words” or
as “hostile-environment harassment” (Taylor, 2012, p. 354) should be restricted.
Yong dismisses 'nihilist' positions on free speech and believes in a principle
based in political morality, what he calls the Free Speech Principle (FSP), based on a
liberal conception of justice. Yong differs from Taylor on what Taylor calls ‘group libel.’
According to Yong, ‘group libel’ is unprotected speech under what he calls the Free
Speech Principle (FSP), because it designates false assertions that hold up to ridicule
or contempt, or bring into disrepute, a racial or religious group (Yong, 2011, p. 401-402).
Given the highly controversial and evaluative nature of the question of how a group
should be characterized (Yong, 2011, p. 402). Taylor defines hate speech as a type of
group libel: speech (oral or written) that argues for the mental, physical, and/or ethical
inferiority as undermining fair equality of opportunity for members of particular
historically-oppressed groups (e.g., blacks, women, Jews, and homosexuals) (Taylor,
2012, p. 353-354).
Yong believes that the term hate speech is a broad designation to usefully
analyze a single category that includes different kinds of speech acts that involve
different kinds of free speech interests and can cause very different kinds of harm
(Yong, 2011, p. 385). Therefore, he classified four different categories of what
constitutes hate speech: (1) targeted vilification, (2) diffuse vilification, (3) organized
political advocacy for exclusionary and/or eliminationist policies, and (4) other
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assertions of fact or value, which constitute an adverse judgment on an identifiable
racial or religious group (Yong, 2011, p. 386). Yong believes the FSP to be a distinct
principle, which goes beyond a general principle of negative liberty such as that
defended by Mill (Yong, 2011, p. 387).
Yong argues that speech unprotected by the First Amendment is regulable.
Regulable speech can be regulated or restricted through legal and institutional means
without violating the First Amendment, or Yong’s FSP (Yong, 2011, p. 388). Even
though some forms of hate speech is regulable and should be restricted, Yong is
concerned that government legislation restricting hate speech could give authority
figures over-breadth in their powers when regulating speech (Yong, 2011, p. 389). He
cites crimes like perjury, bribery, insider trading, solicitations to commit crimes are is
unprotected speech by the First Amendment, and it is simple to show harm towards
society. Institutions such as law enforcement and the courts can regulate such speech
when needed.
Targeted vilification is unprotected speech and uncovered by the FSP, diffuse
vilification and organized political advocacy for exclusionary and eliminationist policies is
unprotected speech, and that other assertions of fact and value, including so-called
group libel, are protected hate speech (Yong, 2011, p. 402).
Yong does not place special weight on the difference between speech and
conduct. He believes hate speech covered by the FSP garners greater protection from
legal restrictions (Yong, 2011, p. 387). Nevertheless, he argues that some hate speech,
consistently with the FSP, cannot be restricted or regulated. Hate speech is
unprotected when there are clear, compelling interests that cause serious harm to the
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intended hearer, or society even if the speech advances some of the interests and
values covered in the FSP (Yong, 2011, p 388). Defamatory speech should restricted,
because it is intended to be intentionally harmful. He finds that some forms of hate
speech is regulable, however, he is concerned that government legislation restricting
hate speech could give authority figures over-breadth in their powers when regulating
speech.(Yong, 2011, p. 389).
Targeted vilification is uncovered by the FSP and unprotected speech, because it
does not promote any free speech interests and its regulation would not violate any free
speech rights. According to the FSP, this form of hate speech is regulable (Yong, 2011,
p.396).
Diffuse vilification differs from targeted vilification inasmuch as it is not directed at
specific individuals or small groups, but is directed either (partly) to a sympathetic public
audience, or at a wide and indeterminate audience (Yong, 2011, p. 396). Most often
this is expressed as symbolic speech, and one example we had covered earlier in this
paper, Collin v. Smith (1978). The speech may be used to wound, insult and intimidate
people of a certain group, but said group may not be the intended audience but just
bystanders. A Nazi march is political speech at some level, and regulating diffuse
vilification could violate the speaker or audience right to autonomy (Yong, 2011, p. 397).
Diffuse vilification cannot be regulated and is considered covered, protected speech
under Yong’s FSP, because the speech doesn’t cause harm when attempting to recruit
supporters to discriminatory points of view. Yet, it acts through a direct intervention in
the public domain sending public signals to targets, but when the law tries to control this
harm it operates simply by attempting to disable the ability to send such public signals; it
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does not attempt to influence the ways in which agents are able to propagate or access
certain views (Yong, 2011, p. 398).
Organized Political Advocacy for Exclusionary and Eliminationist policies are
covered as political speech, but also unprotected which makes it regulable.
Exclusionary policies exclude racial and religious groups from full and equal citizenship
by stripping them of their civil and political rights. Eliminationist policies are used to
remove racial or religious groups from the population through forced repatriation or
ethnic cleansing (Yong, 2011, p. 398). Governments could be convinced by the people
or vice-versa to enact such policies that would be extremely harmful. These situations
have happened before with Nazi Germany, Sri Lanka, Rwanda, Kosovo, and more
recently Sudan (Darfur). The argument from truth discovery seems to me to be
inapplicable here: the FSP, I take it, is important only within a larger commitment to
liberal justice, and such a commitment will discount the possibility that claims which
support the violation of foundational principles of liberal justice are true (Yong, 2011, p.
398).
Participation in democratic self-government strongly protects political speech, but
this category of hate speech offers no clear grounds for protection in an open
democracy, however, regulation of this type of hate speech is legitimate for regulation.
Political equality is crucial to the FSP and political advocacy and organization could
result in electing an anti-democratic government. How can one value democracy even
if it means some elected may call for burning down the government and may advocate
exclusionary and eliminationist polices. One way to fight against this form of hate
speech could be ‘more speech’, that is arguments within a free discussion against the
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advocated policies (Yong, 2011, p. 400). Even though Yong has suggested restrictions,
on this category of hate speech doesn’t violate unjustly free speech rights and that it is
covered as political speech. He asserts it is unprotected by the FSP, which makes it
regulable. His position is silent on whether it should be regulated, because who would
decide what speech counts as falling inside this category (Yong, 2011, p. 401). Yong
makes this assertion based on the notion that no government could effectively make
such a judgment of how this category of hate speech would be adopted, because it
could change from one administration to the next and could lead to abuse. Regardless
of his position on this category of hate speech, it is clear that it violates the FSP and
therefore is regulable.
Assertions of fact and evaluative opinions are widely protected speech, because
they cover arguments from truth, discovery, and democracy. Evaluative opinions
involve all free speech justifications even if attacks on specific racial or religious occur
(Yong, 2011, p. 401). He does not discount that assertions of fact and evaluative
opinions cannot produce harm, but defends this category of speech as protected
because of the powerful free speech interests and rights involved, and the relative
effectiveness of the remedy of ‘more speech’ in these cases (Yong, 2011, p. 401). This
category of speech has cognitive content and can be answered through deliberative and
articulate speech.
Taylor defines hate speech as a type of group libel: speech (oral or written) that
argues for the mental, physical, and/or ethical inferiority as undermining fair equality of
opportunity for members of particular historically-oppressed groups (e.g., blacks,
women, Jews, and homosexuals) (Taylor, 2012, p. 353-354). Taylor questions if
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government restrictions on hate speech are consistent with liberty, and that the priority
of liberty seems to forbid hate speech restriction (Taylor, 2012, pp. 353-354). He
describes liberal egalitarians following Rawls, is committed to basic liberties, but has
conflictions with their belief in socio-economic equality and a strong commitment to
freedom of speech (Taylor, 2012, p.353).
Taylor distinguishes between speech "regulation" and "restriction." He uses the
example of "time, place, and manner" rules as a qualifier of regulations on speech.
Time, place, and manner rules make communication mutually consistent and protect the
"central range of application" of free speech. Taylor states that restrictions on speech
that would limit scientific or political doctrines would be prohibited, because the content
is the target, which threatens liberal values related to open expression (Taylor, 2012, p.
354).
Taylor points out that very narrow limitations on speech content based on
"fighting words," such as racial epithets used in confrontations could be regulated, so
long as they do not threaten the free exercise of public reason and may protect the
central range of application of other basic liberties. The limitations on hate speech
which Taylor describes are prima facie restrictions, because they are at the heart of
such free exercise, which depends on open access to all arguments regarding scientific
and political matters (Taylor, 2012, p. 354).
Taylor tries to find the balance if any, for freedom of speech for both liberty of
conscience and freedom of thought. He discusses how Mill, Rawls, and Thomas
Scanlon have adopted "extremism in defense of liberty" in regards to free speech
(Taylor, 2012, p. 355). Taylor holds that Mill, Rawls, and Scanlon would favor protecting
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hate speech because of the civil libertarian aspect of their philosophies. Taylor
assumes that liberals of all stripes are or should be civil libertarians with respect to
speech, including hate speech. Taylor makes clear in his writing that he wishes to
remain agnostic about hate speech as he has defined it. He stands by his assertion
about "fighting words" (racial epithets) being regulated, because their limitation does not
threaten free exercise of public reason, but he wants a balance with other central
liberties, such as bodily security (Taylor, 2012, p. 355).
Taylor has his own set of principles when balancing free speech rights with what
he calls the "priority of liberty." The priority of the equal-liberty (EL) principle over other
principles of justice (e.g., the fair-equality-of-opportunity [FEO] principle or difference
principle [DP]) and over other concerns as well (e.g., welfare, efficiency, perfection,
piety, etc...), (Taylor, 2012, p. 354). Taylor contends that fairness is a quality of liberal
theories, and most contemporary liberals (classical liberals and liberal egalitarians) have
a civil libertarian viewpoint. He mentions that Rawls also supports the notion that some
basic liberties may be "less essential" than others, and political liberties and the rights of
fair equality of opportunity might be "less compelling" than that for “liberty of conscience
and the rights defining the integrity of the person” (Taylor, 2012, p. 354-355).
Taylor illustrates that Mill, Rawls, and Scanlon would favor protecting hate
speech because of the civil libertarian aspect of their philosophies. Let's assume a law
is proposed to punish (through fines) advocating racial and sexually bigoted doctrines
only on the grounds that said speech would hinder implementation of FEO, especially in
the structures of college-admission committees and employers. Concerns over hate
speech could contribute to socioeconomic inequality can be found throughout
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philosophical and legal literature and case law (Taylor, 2012, p. 355-356).
The cause and effect is clear; speakers advocate bigoted doctrines and those the
audience either complies (consciously or subconsciously) against historically-oppressed
groups damaging the FEO principle (Taylor, 2012, p. 359). The priority of liberty is
violated by restricting hate speech, however, FEO is realized, and therefore, there is a
trade-off between EL and FEO. Nonideal Theory permits tradeoffs between basic
liberties and opportunities/income if they promote “everyone’s interests” (Taylor, 2012,
p. 358). When hate speech is uttered it is usually done so in historically embedded
structures of social oppression by an aggressor that has deep social and psychological
structures of domination and subordination. Because for hate speech to work the
aggressor has to have a structure of power behind them that allows them speak with
such force with authority under social, political, and historical conditions (Taylor, 2012,
p. 360).
Taylor argues that restrictions on hate speech in attempts to curb historical
injustices are could cause more harm than good, because it keeps in place the
structural institutions of racism and sexism by creating power struggles from one group
that has had power historically against a minority class that hasn’t held power
traditionally. He points out that an approach to nonideal theory has worked in
Scandinavian countries, which have been traditionally male dominated. Now women
have equal power politically as well as in the home and in some cases are the majority
bread winners (Taylor, 2012, p. 360). The structures may have been easier to
overcome because they were based on sexism and not racism. Supporters of
restricting hate speech in the U.S. rely on group-based structural oppressions.
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Taylor concludes that regarding hate speech liberal egalitarians have to choose
between free expression and equal educational and employment opportunities for
historically-oppressed groups. He describes how libertarians regard free speech as the
only place where laissez faire is still applicable. Liberals defend free speech and free
association by claiming that redistribution of taxation does not violate autonomy, while
libertarians are opposed to mandatory taxation for redistributive purposes (Taylor, 2012,
p. 366). Laws regarding desegregation of schools and restaurants as well as affirmative
action in hiring practices have done little to eliminate racism and sexism. Liberty and
equality are placed in conflict, but equality takes priority over liberty, why should hate
speech be treated any differently (Taylor, 2012, p. 366).
Taylor states he is on the other side of this debate, although his writing offered
another point of view he questions that basic liberties should have strong priority over
socioeconomic equality. Taylor wants liberal egalitarians to choose between liberty and
equality regarding controversial issues including hate speech and other issues not
related to this paper. He believes when liberal egalitarians finally choose between
liberty and equality then they would be truly committed to liberalism, or not (Taylor,
2012, p. 366).
In conclusion, the racial component of speech in America towards AfricanAmericans and other historically-oppressed groups by the KKK are similar to the racial
rhetoric uttered by Nazi’s in Europe. Burning a cross in an African-American’s yard, is a
symbolic act of hatred, virulent activity associated with hate speech. Swastikas
references to the ‘Third Reich’, the Nazi flag, denying the Holocaust and the ‘Heil Hitler’
salute are all banned in Europe because of the racial component of that speech.
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Europeans enacted statutes making it illegal to incite hatred, provoke violence, insult,
and ridicule, or defame in a manner apt to breach the public peace regarding hate
speech. In America, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act, Title VI and Title VII
prohibits a racially hostile education and work environment. In addition, Congress has
made it a crime to assault or kill a person with a clear racial motivation, perceived
gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, or disability. Congress could pass a
narrowly tailored statute directed at historically inflicted groups protecting them from
hate speech in public places as the European have.
The Supreme Court has ruled that group libel is unprotected speech, because
language aimed at racial and religious groups could lead to a breach of the peace, thus
inciting imminent lawless action. “Fighting words” are not protected speech, because
their very utterance can inflict injury and serves no intellectual purpose to advance
society, such language does not express any exposition of ideas. For hate speech to
be completely banned in the United States the Court would have to overturn R.A.V. and
Brandenburg. Holding a Klan rally and advocating political reform through violence
aimed at racial minorities’ does incite imminent lawless action and would produce such
an action. Burning a cross in an African-American family’s yard is something a
reasonable person of any race would find abhorrent, the act is to intimidate a person or
group, particularly African-Americans and is in direct correlation with Nazi symbols and
speech towards Jews in Europe. For these reasons hate speech in America should not
be protected by the Constitution.
For equality to flourish us as a nation must continue to work for the protection of
all citizens regardless of their individual characteristics. Strive to protect the dignity of
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all human beings, and to prevent harmful, hateful speech towards one another, while
protecting the First Amendment for only when we can respect each other with our
speech only then will speech truly be free.

30

REFERENCES
Bleich, Erik. Source: The Rise of Hate Speech and Hate Crime Laws in Liberal
Democracies: Journal of Ethnic & Migration Studies; Jul2011, Vol. 37 Issue 6, p917934, 18p. DOI:10.1080/1369183X.2011.576195.
Feldman, Noah (2015) Oklahoma's Right to Expel Frat Boys
http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-03-11/oklahoma-s-right-to-expel-frat-boys
Milton, John. The Areoagitica. http://www.stlawrenceinstitute.org/vol14mit.html.
Shoemaker, P., Tankard, W., Lasorsa, D (2004) How to Build Social Science Theories.
Syracuse University and the University of Texas at Austin.
Stein, E. (1986) History against Free speech: The new German law against the
“Auschwitz” –and other-“lies”, Michigan Law Review, 85 (277): 277-324.
Stout, David (2007) House Votes to Expand Hate-Crime Protection. The New York
Times May 4, 2007. http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/04/washington/04hate.html
Taylor, Robert S. (2012) Hate Speech, the Priority of Liberty, and the Temptations of
Nonideal Theory. Source: Ethical Theory & Moral Practice; Jun2012, Vol. 15 Issue 3,
p353-368, 16p. DOI: 10.1007/s10677-011-9287-6
Trout, Matthew. FEDERALIZING HATE: CONSTITUTIONAL AND PRACTICAL
LIMITATIONS TO THE MATTHEW SHEPARD AND JAMES BYRD, JR. HATE CRIMES
PREVENTION ACT OF 2009. Source: American Criminal Law Review, 2015/01/01, Vol:
52, p131.
Volokh, Eugene. (2015) No, it’s not constitutional for the University of Oklahoma to
expel students for racist speech [UPDATED in light of the students’ expulsion]
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/03/10/no-a-publicuniversity-may-not-expel-students-for-racist-speech/
Walsh, W. Brian (2009) Federal Hate Crimes Statute: An Unconstitutional Exercise of
Legislative Power. Source: The Heritage Foundation. Web Memo #2416 on Legal
Issues. http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2009/04/federal-hate-crimes-statutean-unconstitutional-exercise-of-legislative-power
Yong, Caleb (2011) Does Freedom of Speech Include Hate Speech?
caleb.yong@politics.ox.ac.uk.Source: Res Publica (13564765). Nov2011, Vol. 17 Issue
4, p385-403. 19p. DOI: 10.1007/s11158-011-9158-y.
Civil Rights Act of 1964 - CRA - Title VII - Equal Employment Opportunities - 42 US
Code Chapter 21. http://finduslaw.com/civil-rights-act-1964-cra-title-vii-equalemployment-opportunities-42-us-code-chapter-21.
H.R.1592 - Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2007 110th
Congress (2007-2008). https://www.congress.gov/bill/110th-congress/house-bill/1592

31

Title 18, U.S.C., Section 245 the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Title 18, U.S.C., Section 241 Conspiracy Against Rights.
Title 18. U.S.C., Section 249 Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr., Hate Crimes
Prevention Act.
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919)
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 252 (1952)
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)
Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (1978)
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942)
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992)
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989)
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003)
Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993)
Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. (2011)

32

VITA
Graduate School
Southern Illinois University
Leonard Calvin Simpson, II
lcsimp@yahoo.com
Southern Illinois University Carbondale
Bachelor of Science, Journalism and Political Science, May 2013
Research Paper Title:
Should Hate Speech Be Constitutionally Protected?
Major Professor: William Freivogel

